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The « human » component of the 
surveillance systems 
 Reports by actors= key element of the system 
 
 Farmers and private veterinarians : on the front 
line of the animal diseases surveillance 
 
 Low farmers’ participation into preventive control 
programs or surveillance program becomes an 
object of study for sociologists or health specialists  
 Casal et al, Prev Vet Med, 2007 
 Hefferman et al, Prev Vet.Med 2008,  
 Palmer et al, European Society for Rural Sociology,2009, 
 Elbers et al,  Rev sci tech Off.Int.Epiz, 2010, 
 Prete,  Sociologie du Travail, 2008 
 1/  Introduction 
How socio-antropology can contribute 
to improve surv. systems? 
Farmer’s decision to 
report or not  
Common levers of the sanitary autorities  
Juridical means reporting = 
legal duty 
Other considerations  
Incentive means financial 
compensation 
 2/ Introduction 
Socio-antropology may contribute to 
understand the (dys)functioning of a 
surveillance system 
What is possibly 
influencing the circulation 
of  sanitary information 
within an animal health 
surveillance system? 
4/ Analytical grid 
Farmers’ risk framing 
Social incentives 
Social norms? Framing = tool to describe the way an 
event (disease) is perceived, named 
and handled      
(E. Goffman, 1974,  C.Rosenberg, 1992) Trust 
Trust and credibility 
 (Wynne,1992, 1996, 2006 
Is the suspected low level of 
reporting in Vietnam still a 
question of awareness? 
What are the components of the 
farmer’s representation of H5N1? 
(pandemic risk, zoonotic risk, 
epizootic risk,  economical risk?) 
Will reporting a suspect case of 
HPAI be regarded as a dishonor, 
a betrayal of the neighboring 
farmers or as a civic behavior? 
Do the Vietnamese poultry farmers 
trust state veterinarians and the 
general HPAI control policies? 
Farmer’s awareness 
= “educative approach”  
(Palmer et al, 2009) 
= Science/risk-centered 
stance 
Application to the Vietnamese context of 
the surveillance of HPAI 
 HPAI = notifiable disease 
 Compensation scheme 
 Strong central commitment (vaccination) 
 Important international support 
 Under-reporting of HPAI suspected 
Our objective = 
 Understand the sanitary information circulation (content of 
the information; method, scope and speed of circulation; 
actors involved; actions triggered as a result of the information 
received)  
  and the economical and social incentives (economical 
rationality and social norms) for disseminating or withholding 
information? ” 
 
 
5/ Context of study 
The study 
 Two communities of poultry farmers from 2 
communes in the RRD in Vietnam (zone of 
high risk for H5N1) 
 Selection of 2 contrasting situations 
(previous field works) 
 19 interviews of poultry farmers + commune 
veterinarians (private veterinarians with a 
public mission) + veterinary drug sellers 
◦ check-list  
◦ Recorded + written recording sheet 
 
6/ Methodology 
 An active informal surveillance system 
does exist 
  Sanitary information circulating among farmers, 
neighbours and traders 
 Effect of the HPAI crisis on that circulation 
 Reactions of farmers when disease reported 
within the farmers’epidemiological territory 
(500m to 3km) 
 Information considered more useful than 
information disseminated by official channels 
(commune vets, loudspeakers) 
 
7/ Results 1/7 
Farmer’s risk framing depends on 
the epidemiological context         
Farmer’s frame of the risk related to H5N1 
 
  
Commune B Commune A 
H5N1 = sporadic event, a threat 
             emerging disease 
H5N1 = now part of the routine.  
      endemic disease  
Zoonotic and epizootic risk Epizootic risk only 
Farmers feel  helpless, look for 
assistance throught the  formal  
system 
Farmers have a high level of 
perceived self-efficacy and do not 
see need to contact official vet 
Fear the direct consequences of 
the disease 
Fear the indirect consequences of 
the disease (ban of transport) 
 
“with experience, we have 
succeeded until now in 
controlling the extent of the 
epide ic with outbreaks 
here and there, so there is 
no need to inform the 
district or the province” 
 
 
8/ Results 2/7 
No common object under surveillance 
 Case definition  
◦ very variable 
◦ built on experience of first outbreaks (before vaccination) 
◦ very cautious attitude of the commune vets 
◦ Alert for commune A: when it is out of control 
 
 
 
farmer 4 «  if 30% of the 
Muscovy ducks are closing their 
eyes, have diarrhea and stop 
eating, I sell the flock » 
farmer 6 « with 60% of mortality and typical symptoms, 
farmers have concluded it was avian influenza » 
farmer 5 « If I only have 20% 
mortality, I do not inform, 
because this is not a big 
loss »  
Village vet A «  If we loose 60% of the poultry population in the 
village within 3-4 months, we do not report to the district, this is 
not a serious epidemic» 
Village vet B  «When I am sure of the diagnosis, I inform, because 
we should not talk nonsense » 
9/ Results 3/7 
No efficient incentives to report to the formal 
surv. system 
 Legal,  
 Economical (compensation policy) 
 or social/political incentives to report to formal 
system  
 = not effective in commune A 
 Farmer 6 « it does not change anything to report to 
the commune vet or not. If we report, we do not have 
compensation, so farmers prefer to sell to get some 
money »  
 « Technical incentive » to report for commune B 
  
10/ Results 4/7 
Social incentives to report to the 
informal system 
 Social incentive to report to other farmers 
(informal surv syst.) 
  = effective within farmer’s neighbourhood 
Farmer 5 « I prefer to inform the other farmers than the 
commune vet, for the common interest and for them to avoid 
losses, we should not be selfish » 
Farmer 8 « Critics from neighbors would be inevitable in case of 
culling if I would report to the commune vet in case of 
epidemy » 
 
Social norm in commune A= to report to other 
farmers but NOT to report to formal system 
 
…But no commitment outside of the neighbourhood 
 11/ Results 5/7 
 The local veterinarians: an interface 
between the formal and informal 
systems 
 The “association” “village and communal 
veterinarians” can be defined as a “mediator 
of the surveillance” Prete (2008): 
◦ Aware of all significant health events in their village 
and commune.  
◦ In commune A: found a compromise between 
farmers’interest α local technical and political 
pressures   
 
12/ Results 6/7 
Limited central power over local 
governments 
 Commune B strictly applies the central policies 
 Commune A found a compromise between local 
economical interest, control of the disease and 
national policy 
 
  Exemple of the vietnamese political  system 
paradox 
 
“This is not uncommon that local government 
interpret central policies any way they like” (Vu, T., 
in Avian influenza: science, policy and politics, 2009) 
 
13/ Results 7/7 
How to build bridges? 
 Need an epidemiological consensus: 
  fill the gap between farmer’s  and local authorities experience-based knowledge 
versus central pandemic–based policy  
 
 Enhance trust into institutions:   
◦ Test and promote compensation policy 
◦ Transparency into HPAI control  policy:  What? How?  
 
 Strengthen credibility and responsibility of the actors at the 
interface: 
 Stronger technical background  more useful for farmers or village vets 
 Diagnosis tool (Free testing disconnected from notification : Dutch exemple on 
LPAI) 
 Better use of the available sanitary information  more rapid actions 
 
 Accompany farmers in redefining the risk:  eg. risk of long 
distance transmission  
 
 Dynamic definition of the object under surveillance:   
◦ harmonization of the H5N1 case definition:  regular education of vets and 
farmers 14/ Perspectives 
On the interest of the collaboration with 
social sciences 
 As an epidemiologist: an opportunity to change 
our point of view  
 
 Better capture the complexity of the system of 
actors involved into surveillance 
....need a good knowledge of the context  
… or more time 
 
 From standardized technical messages to an 
phased, adapted α changing surveillance and 
control options 
 
 
 
15/ Conclusion 
Thank you for your attention 
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